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Summary
Summary
Economic historians have made great progress in unraveling the causes of the Great Depression, but not until Scott Sumner came along has anyone explained the multitude of twists and turns the economy took. In The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Government Policy Shocks, and the Great Depression, Sumner offers his magnum opus-the first book to comprehensively explain both monetary and non-monetary causes of that cataclysm. Drawing on financial market data and contemporaneous news stories, Sumner shows that the Great Depression is ultimately a story of incredibly bad policymaking-by central bankers, legislators, and two presidents-especially mistakes related to monetary policy and wage rates. He also shows that macroeconomic thought has long been captive to a false narrative that continues to misguide policymakers in their quixotic quest to promote robust and sustainable economic growth. The Midas Paradox is a landmark treatise that solves mysteries that have long perplexed economic historians, and corrects misconceptions about the true causes, consequences, and cures of macroeconomic instability. Like Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, it is one of those rare books destined to shape all future research on the subject.
Author Notes
Scott B. Sumner is Professor of Economics at Bentley University, USA. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago and he edits the influential blog ""The Money Illusion."" In 2012, the Chronicle of Higher Education referred to Sumner as ""among the most influential"" economist bloggers, along with N. Gregory Mankiw of Harvard University and Paul Krugman of Princeton University. In 2012, Foreign Policy ranked Sumner jointly with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 15th on its list of ""100 Top Global Thinkers."" Professor Sumner is a contributor to numerous scholarly volumes, and his articles and reviews have appeared in such journals as the Journal of Political Economy; Business and Society Review; Journal of Policy Modeling; and Economic Inquiry.
Reviews (1)
Choice Review
Sumner (Bentley Univ.) provides his perspective on the causes of the Great Depression in this lengthy but excellent book. Primarily written for academic macroeconomists, this book does four important things. First, Sumner argues for the importance of high-frequency gold demand shocks as a force behind changes in short-term output. Key to his argument is the role of private gold hoarding, something overlooked by others. Second, in making his case, he provides an excellent economic history of the Great Depression, highlighting important monetary and public policy changes important to his narrative. Third, in presenting the evidence regarding specific historical episodes, he thoroughly summarizes the literature on the topic, highlighting what is important about each paper or theory and what it cannot explain. Fourth, Sumner's approach is an illustration of his argument that macroeconomists need better economic history and the history of economic thought to understand the past. The details, especially institutional ones, matter for understanding something as complex as an economy. This is most clear in the chapter on the gold panic of 1937. The book could be used in an economic history or intermediate macro course at selective institutions. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty and researchers. --Joshua C. Hall, West Virginia University
Table of Contents
Preface | p. xv |
Part I Gold, Wages, and the Great Depression | |
1 Introduction | p. 3 |
Part II The Great Contraction | |
2 From the Wall Street Crash to the First Banking Panic 3 | p. 5 |
3 The German Crisis of 1931 | p. 85 |
4 The Liquidity Trap of 1932 | p. 123 |
Part III Bold and Persistent Experimentation: Macroeconomic Policy during 1933 | |
5 A Foolproof Plan for Reflation | p. 173 |
6 The NIRA and the Hidden Depression | p. 201 |
7 The Rubber Dollar | p. 231 |
Part IV Back on the Gold Standard | |
8 The Demise of the Gold Bloc | p. 273 |
9 The Gold Panic of 1937 | p. 297 |
10 The Midas Curse and the Roosevelt Depression | p. 315 |
Part V Conclusion | |
11 The Impact of the Depression on Twentieth-Century Macroeconomics | p. 357 |
12 What Caused the Great Depression? | p. 387 |
13 Theoretical Issues in Modeling the Great Depression | p. 415 |
References | p. 469 |
Index | p. 485 |
About the Author | p. 509 |